

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday 22 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

(Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO

Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES

Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. I.J. SHAW  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of  
America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the one hundred and twelfth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Today we are resuming our discussion of items 5(b) and (c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52) in accordance with the co-Chairmen's recommendation (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) adopted last week by the Committee. As I have said previously, the United Kingdom delegation welcomes the Committee's decision to revert to regular discussions on general and complete disarmament. Although we continue to regard the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty as a matter to which the Committee should give priority, nevertheless we cannot overlook the fact that negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament still remains our basic task.

At our last meeting, on 20 March the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States set the stage, as it were, for our renewed discussions of general and complete disarmament by restating the positions of both sides on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments in stage I. The representative of the United States reminded us that a draft treaty article V (ENDC/69) is on the table, setting out in proposed treaty language the Western position on reductions of armaments.

Let me say at once that the United Kingdom delegation endorses the remarks made by our United States colleague on that occasion and associates itself with his clear restatement of the Western position. We consider that the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments by means of a 30 per cent cut across the board represents a sound and realistic method of disarmament in stage I. Clearly such a reduction would be the most straightforward way of starting the process of balanced, orderly and progressive disarmament.

As Mr. Stelle pointed out (ENDC/PV.111, p.13), the Western proposals would not require any significant change in the existing armaments mix. At the same time, the existing military balance would be retained at the end of stage I, but of course on a significantly lower level of armaments. We have pointed out in the past that these Western proposals are negotiable, but they are designed to be fair to all concerned in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). I therefore urge our Soviet colleague to reconsider whether he should not now recommend to his

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Government that the Western proposals should be adopted. After all, the Soviet Government has already made a move in this direction by accepting the 30 per cent reduction approach in stage I for conventional armaments, and we in the West have welcomed that move; but I earnestly hope that the Soviet Government can now see its way to extending that approach to all types of major armaments in stage I.

I realize, of course, that the Soviet Government has hitherto adopted a different approach from that of the West to the problem of eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles, and that it believes that a so-called radical solution of that problem would eradicate the danger of nuclear war by the end of stage I. We have pointed out on numerous occasions in the past what we believe to be the fallacy of such an approach, and I do not propose to take up the Committee's time today by repeating the arguments against the Soviet approach. They are well known to the Committee. But clearly, if the Soviet Government were now prepared to settle for a 30 per cent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I, that would be a tremendous step forward in our work.

And here, if I may, I urge our Soviet colleague not to underestimate the significant results which would be achieved by the end of stage I under the Western proposals. A 30 per cent reduction across the board would arrest and turn back the present arms race to a very marked extent. It would contribute greatly to the growth of confidence between States which is such an essential condition for achieving general and complete disarmament. Moreover, the very fact that the major Powers had agreed to destroy, and had indeed destroyed, almost one-third of their present armaments, both nuclear and conventional, would in itself lessen the danger of nuclear war in a profoundly significant way.

Having said that, I should like now to turn to some of the points raised by our Soviet colleague at our meeting on 20 March. I am bound to confess that on the whole I found his remarks disappointing. For example, I do not think it helps the work of our Committee --- it certainly wastes a great deal of our time --- to have to listen to a series of propaganda charges to the effect that our various efforts in the West to maintain and improve our defence posture lead to a sharpening of international tension. Our Soviet colleague knows as well as everyone else around this table that, until such time as we can reach agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, States and groups of States will continue to look to their defence. That may be a regrettable fact, but it is none the less an inevitable fact

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

which the Soviet Union and its allies just have to accept, and which of course they do accept in actual practice.

I am bound to say also that I found deplorable Mr. Tsarapkin's incredible allegation that in the Caribbean last autumn ---

"the aggressive actions of the United States and its military allies

brought mankind to the brink of world war." (ENDC/PV.111, p.27)

and that a military conflict was prevented only by "the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Government." (ibid.) I thought that my leader, Mr. Godber, had put this matter in perspective when, at our meeting on 26 November 1962, in reply to similar remarks by Mr. Tsarapkin, he compared Soviet actions in the Caribbean to ---

"the efforts of the small boy who sets a house on fire and then calls the

fire brigade to help put it out." (ENDC/PV.83, p.32)

I devoutly hope we shall have no more of such allegations.

Apart from those general points, I found our Soviet colleague's remarks disappointing in some other respects. Although he quite rightly reminded the Committee of the modification of the Soviet draft treaty regarding the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1), I do not think he has yet fully or even adequately responded to the requests for clarification which have been put forward at various times by both non-aligned and Western delegations. The Soviet proposal therefore remains almost as cryptic as when it was first announced by Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127, p.38-40) at the General Assembly last September. Mr. Tsarapkin claimed on Wednesday that the necessary clarifications and explanations of the Soviet proposal had already been given. He said:

"Thus the Western Powers can take without delay a decision in principle

on this question." (ENDC/PV.111, p.35)

And he went on to complain that six months had already passed since that proposal had been announced and that he was still awaiting a clear reply from the United States whether or not it was prepared to accept the proposal.

I think I can only say that the solution lies entirely in the hands of our Soviet colleague himself. He has not had and he cannot get a clear reply, for the simple reason that the Soviet proposal is still unclear to us in a number of important respects. We have been asked to accept that Soviet proposal, but we simply cannot form a view about it one way or the other until we have a very much clearer idea of what is proposed and what it would involve. We simply have not yet

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

received sufficient information to enable us to assess the significance and the implication of his Government's proposal. It is therefore up to him to provide us with the necessary information. For instance, I do not think that Mr. Tsarapkin has yet answered all the questions which were posed by Mr. Stelle and by my own predecessor, Sir Michael Wright, at our plenary meeting on 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90), nor those asked by Mr. Stelle at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.111, p.16).

In view of the considerable interest shown around this table in the Soviet proposal, I am bound to say that I find our Soviet colleague's attitude rather puzzling. Perhaps I may remind him that we are perfectly prepared to regard his Government's proposal as an attempt to solve a problem on which we are all agreed in principle, the need to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament which, among other things, provides for the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. I for one welcome the fact that, as I understand, the Soviet Union at last recognizes that there is room for more than one point of view on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I. I find it encouraging that the Soviet Government has now apparently recognized the difficulties which were inherent in its earlier proposals; and I also find it encouraging that, again as I understand it, the Soviet Government now realizes that the danger of nuclear war would not necessarily be eliminated merely by the alleged elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I.

These indications of new thinking behind the Soviet proposal suggest that the Soviet Government is now taking a more realistic view of this problem than hitherto. Moreover, as Sir Michael Wright suggested on 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90, p.44), the Soviet Government now apparently agrees that the first two stages of the disarmament process should take place under the protection of our respective nuclear umbrellas. So far as it goes, this change in the Soviet attitude is also to be welcomed, although we have reservations about the point in time at which those protective umbrellas should be removed. That is a point to which I may wish to come back on a future occasion.

But meanwhile perhaps I may just suggest to the Committee one or two implications of the Soviet proposal in so far as we understand it at present. The Committee will recall that Sir Michael Wright put forward some of our thoughts in this connexion on



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

10 December; and perhaps I may commend to my colleagues the relevant section of his statement on that point (ibid., pp. 40-47). This morning I should like to offer one or two additional thoughts, which I do in no spirit of criticism but merely to indicate some of the points on which we still feel we require a great deal more clarification and elaboration if we are to give the Soviet proposal full and useful study. The United Kingdom delegation has of course studied the relatively small amount of additional information which Mr. Tsarapkin gave us at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.111, pp. 28 et seq.), but I must say frankly that on the basis of such information as we have at present we cannot escape the conclusion that the Soviet proposal is illogical and self-contradictory. We consider that reasons far more convincing than those so far displayed by the Soviet delegation will have to be brought forward if we are to be persuaded that their proposal is in any way superior to the Western disarmament proposals.

I have no doubt that many of us here will already have noticed at least one major difficulty arising out of Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks. The Soviet proposal specifies, among other things, the retention of an agreed and strictly-limited number of intercontinental missiles which, in Mr. Tsarapkin's own words ---

"... would be a deterrent which would invalidate any attempt to retain missiles of aggression secretly in violation of the treaty.

Any State which might venture to embark upon aggression would realize perfectly well that sure retribution would follow." (ibid., p.33)

If the certainty of punishment which our Soviet colleague stressed is never to be in doubt, then both sides must be assured that the agreed number, and only the agreed number, of intercontinental missiles would in fact be retained, and that there would be no way of escaping their effects if they had to be used. The Soviet Government has not yet told us what numbers it has in mind; but even without that information I think it is clear that, the smaller the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles involved, the more important it becomes to ensure that the balance cannot be upset by the use of illegally-hidden missiles or military aircraft or by any improvised means of delivery.

If we have correctly understood the remarks made by our Soviet colleague at the last meeting, he is maintaining that each side could guard itself against bad faith ---

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

that is to say, against the danger that the other side might hold missiles over and above the agreed number by retaining anti-missile missiles. But if a State should have a good anti-missile defence, and therefore the ability to ward off all intercontinental ballistic missiles directed against it --- whether they be legally or illegally retained missiles --- then surely it need no longer be influenced in its behaviour by the knowledge that violations would bring inescapable punishment. In a word, the two systems -- one side's anti-missile defence and the other side's intercontinental missiles --- would tend to cancel each other out. The sure punishment stressed by Mr. Tsarapkin would no longer be sure; the inescapable retribution would no longer be inescapable.

Mr. Tsarapkin's argument that anti-aircraft missiles guard against the danger of the improvised use of civil aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons also seems to us to be invalid; because we must remember that, in the normal course of events, civil aircraft from the West do fly over countries of the Soviet bloc, and vice versa. There will be no way of knowing whether such aircraft are going about their legal business or not; and I am sure that Mr. Tsarapkin is not suggesting that they should all be shot down just to be on the safe side. So it seems to us that Mr. Tsarapkin's claim is not well founded, that the Soviet proposal for the retention of a limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and ground-to-air missiles eliminates all doubts and objections voiced by the Western Powers.

I must say that it still seems to us that the only means of making sure that each side kept to its given word would be a rigorous system of inspection and verification on the ground to make sure, first, that no missiles in excess of those that had been agreed upon had been retained; and secondly that no civil aircraft or other means could be employed for the delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals for inspection in stage I and stage II are just not adequate for that purpose. I hope very much, therefore, that our Soviet colleague will let us have the benefit of his more considered views on this fundamental point at a later meeting; because, before we can properly examine the Soviet proposal, we have to ask, we must ask: what verification measures has the Soviet Union in mind to assure each side that no other missiles and no improvised means of delivery of nuclear weapons exist or can be made to exist? As I say, in our view the present Soviet proposal is, in that respect, quite inadequate.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Those are some early comments by the United Kingdom delegation on what our Soviet colleague has so far told us; and we shall have others to make in due course. Meanwhile, we look forward to further substantive discussions about the Soviet proposal, and I trust that the Soviet Government will co-operate in our work here by instructing our Soviet colleague to elaborate its proposal so that we can assess its implications and the extent to which it may contribute to our negotiations.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): On resuming our debates on the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, the elaboration of which is the main task facing our Committee, we deem it useful to recall briefly our position of principle towards the specific issue contained in points 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the mutually-agreed working agenda (ENDC/52). This is a problem which concerns the very contents of the first stage of the disarmament process. The long period which has elapsed since these debates were interrupted makes it necessary that, beyond the details, which undoubtedly have their own importance too, we should highlight what is essential in order to understand the confronting positions as well as the proposals which are an embodiment of those positions.

The position of principle of the Romanian delegation on this problem is known. In the first stage an end must be put for ever to the nuclear danger. There are several possible ways of reaching that goal. A first way would be to liquidate all nuclear weapons and to stop their manufacture in the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament. That is what the Soviet Union was proposing before 1960, and it is what the Soviet Union would be ready to give its consent to even now, were the Western Powers to agree. A second way would be to liquidate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. That is what the Soviet Union has been proposing since 1960, and is still proposing in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1) that it has submitted to this Committee.

Taking into account that the Western Powers do not accept the total liquidation of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, and in order to meet the position of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union proposed an alteration to the effect that, as

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

an exception, the Soviet Union and the United States of America should have the right to retain on their own territories a strictly limited, mutually-agreed number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type. I am referring to the speech made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, before the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/FV.1127, p.38-40). That is a proposal which could settle the matter. Over six months have passed since the Soviet Union made the proposal, which has obviously the character of a compromise, and still the Western Powers have not given any clear answer whether or not they accept it.

Such a clear answer, with no shade of ambiguity, is absolutely necessary for the progress of our negotiations. The attempts to elude it, behind various screens, tell their own tale. For a long time we have listened here to all kinds of greetings and welcoming remarks addressed to the Gromyko proposal by the Western delegations. The time for welcoming it is over. The time has come for unequivocal statements and resolute declarations. There is no need to over-emphasize that only proposals meant to deliver peoples, and that as soon as possible, from the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war are in keeping with the aspirations of all the peoples for peace and security.

The stand taken by the Western Powers on the contents of the first stage and, generally speaking, on the way in which the process of general and complete disarmament is to be organized, is fundamentally different. That stand -- and in this connexion it suffices to refer to the statement of the United States representative on 20 March (ENDC/FV.111, p.12) -- was presented in the past and is still being presented as an embodiment of the idea of a gradual across-the-board reduction, namely, a 30 per cent cut of armaments during the first stage. Without going into details, I shall content myself with stressing, first, that the most striking feature of the United States plan called by its authors an "across-the-board reduction", is that it does not provide for an across-the-board reduction.

Indeed, we are not faced with the proposal that the quantity of nuclear weapons or the capability of destruction of nuclear weapons should be reduced in the first stage. It is those very weapons that form today the overwhelming majority of the

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

world's destructive power. One single bomb of two megatons is equivalent in its blast effect to the total amount of explosives used in the course of world war II. But how many atom bombs of two megatons are there now on the globe? How many bombs of a power many times greater than two megatons are now lying in the arsenals of the world, and yet how many more are ready for use on their delivery vehicles? It is self-evident that the measure proposed by the United States is not sufficient to meet the real security needs of mankind. Faced with a menace which differs in quality from all the dangers that have ever threatened humanity, we must not adopt half-measures, but we must adopt radical ones. Such radical measures alone are capable of curbing the tremendous nuclear danger.

At this stage I think it is useful to draw the Committee's attention to another aspect of the United States proposals upon which Mr. Stelle did not dwell in his speech at the last meeting, but which, as appears from the paper submitted to this Committee by the United States delegation on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30), represents an essential integrant part of the Western stand. I am referring to the fact that the United States delegation suggests that, while reducing the military potential --

"in a gradual and balanced manner," we should be "at the same time gradually developing the peace-keeping institutions to safeguard the security of nations in a disarmed world." (ENDC/FV.111, p.12)

The Romanian delegation, like all the other socialist delegations, is of course, in favour of measures and institutions which tend to secure peace in the world. The very presence of the Romanian People's Republic in the United Nations is explained by the conviction of the Romanian Government that it is both useful and necessary to participate in international institutions which have been created to ensure international peace and security. In conformity with that stand, which is the stand taken by the Romanian Government, I feel in duty bound to state that the United States proposals contained in the document entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" (ENDC/30), with regard to the setting-up and development of institutions which are far from able to guarantee peace and security in the world, actually spell peril for international peace and security.

I have already had the opportunity of stating that the United States Government's Outline of basic provisions provides for the setting-up of a series of international

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

bodies -- such as, for example, the peace force and the peace observation corps -- which in fact would substitute themselves for the United Nations. May I be permitted to say that that would amount to a serious infringement of the sovereignty of States and to a violation of the principles proclaimed by the United Nations Charter? It would amount to an encroachment upon the respect to which sovereign States are entitled.

The problem has two essential aspects. The first is that, in a world which has passed through the process of general and total disarmament, the need to ensure the maintenance of peace will present itself in a manner essentially different from that in which it exists today. For any logically-thinking mind it is obvious that nowadays what endangers world peace and the security of States is precisely the existence of large armed forces; it is precisely the existence of weapons endowed with a capability of destruction without precedent in history. When such forces and weapons no longer exist, neither world peace nor the security of States will be imperilled any more. It is my belief that there is no need to stress that aspect of the problem any further.

The other aspect of our problem needs emphasizing: it is the one touching upon State sovereignty. The Romanian delegation feels that the cause of disarmament, which is the cause of ensuring peace in relations between States, can on no account be served by encroachments perpetrated upon the sovereignty of States by the creation of bodies and institutions of a supranational character whose activities would infringe upon essential attributes pertaining to a State: sovereignty and independence. On 3 May, 1962, the Romanian delegation stated in this Committee:

"General and complete disarmament and the maintenance of peace in general cannot be promoted through measures which aim at violating the United Nations Charter, at undermining the United Nations, the main institution called upon to watch over the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Peace cannot be built upon the ruins of the sovereignty of States. Peace and disarmament can be ensured only through the co-operation of States, sovereign and equal in their sovereignty." (ENDC/PV.30, p.34)

Indeed, the entire evolution of contemporary international relations bears testimony to the vigour of the fight waged by numerous peoples to secure their State independence; and it stands witness equally to the tenacity with which they defend and strengthen their independence and sovereignty once they have them.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

According to contemporary international law, according to the United Nations Charter, relations between States must be built above all upon their equality in sovereignty, and in the right to peace, to security and to non-interference in their internal affairs. Relations between States must be based on their co-operation. Anything built in the name of international co-operation but in fact aiming at subordinating certain States to other States would not serve the cause of international security, the cause of peace.

At a time when our Committee is engaged in an effort to reach agreement on a test-ban treaty as soon as possible, France, a member of this Committee, has carried out an underground nuclear explosion in the Algerian Sahara. That nuclear test -- which is a continuation of the chain of nuclear-weapon tests undertaken by the Western nuclear Powers in violation of resolution 1762 (XVII), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, calling upon all States to cease nuclear-weapon tests not later than 1 January 1963, cannot but exert a negative influence upon our proceedings. It is obvious that the test does not help to ameliorate the international climate, to brighten the political horizon. Quite the contrary.

The Romanian delegation associates itself with the delegations which during our last meeting voiced their protest against the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the French Government. The unconcealed disregard for the sovereignty of the Algerian people, which had openly expressed its will that such an explosion should not be carried out on the territory of its country, the disregard for world public opinion, which asks that an end be put once and for all to nuclear explosions -- those are facts that go against the interests of peace and security of the African peoples, against the interests of peace and security of all the peoples the world over.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As we are resuming the discussion of general and complete disarmament the Canadian delegation thought that it would be appropriate to look over the record of our previous meetings, and even those of earlier disarmament conferences, to see whether there has been any progress and, if so, what the prospects are for extending that progress. During the last round of negotiations some of us complained of the lack of results and were pessimistic about the chances of achieving substantial agreements in the immediate future.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation is unhappy -- as I am sure all of us are -- that this Committee, after having been in existence now for over a year, has not yet agreed on any of the important questions before it. We had hoped that the common interest of the major Powers in halting the arms race would have led to some concrete results, some measure of success in reversing the fatal spiral of the competition in arms. While that has not yet been achieved, we are nevertheless convinced that if examined in a broader perspective -- perhaps of the grim vista of warfare over the centuries -- the history of these negotiations and of earlier discussions on disarmament has shown a very definite trend towards compromise and agreement on the major issues. The pace may be hesitant and slow, but there has nevertheless been a continued movement forward, and that can be readily seen by comparing the disarmament proposals submitted both by the United States and by the Soviet Union before and after the last international conference on disarmament -- that is, the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament of 1960.

The paper which is now being distributed<sup>1/</sup> sets out in somewhat diagrammatic form the positions of the two sides on certain of the important questions at various times during the last three years. It is being circulated in the hope that it may enable the members of the Committee to follow my statement a little more easily. I propose to examine some of the important moves towards compromise which have been made by the United States and by the Soviet Union, and to try to suggest ways in which a greater measure of agreement can be achieved.

During the last round of negotiations, in November and December 1962, and more recently since we have started discussing general and complete disarmament again, the Soviet Union and several other communist representatives have reminded us of the amendments which the Soviet Union had submitted during the Conference in an effort to find common ground with the United States. I need hardly say that the Canadian Government has welcomed the new proposals of the Soviet Union. However, I think it should be emphasized that the United States also has tried to meet the position of the Soviet Union in a number of fields. It would be wrong to overlook the compromise proposals which the United States has brought forward.

The subjects which I want to touch upon today are: first, the form of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the time within which it is to

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<sup>1/</sup> ENDC/79



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

be achieved; second, disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; third, disarmament with respect to conventional forces and weapons; fourth, peacekeeping; fifth, collateral measures.

I need hardly stress the importance of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 19 September 1961 (ENDC/5). In agreeing to principles such as those concerning balance and verification the United States and the Soviet Union successfully resolved a number of difficulties and reached a common position on some of the fundamentals of the disarmament process. In doing so they have laid an adequate foundation for a disarmament agreement. On the basis of those agreed principles, progress has been achieved on certain specific problems of disarmament. That in turn gives ground for hope that the positions of the two sides can come even closer together, and more quickly too, and that that will lead to final agreement on general and complete disarmament.

I shall comment first of all on the positions of the two sides on the form of the agreement on disarmament and the time in which it is to be achieved. Although there were basic differences in the form of earlier disarmament plans of the two sides submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960, by the end of that Conference both the United States and the Soviet Union had moved towards a common approach to the overall structure of an agreement and the method of staging disarmament measures. That development was carried forward by both sides at the outset of the Eighteen-Nation Conference, when, on 19 March 1962, the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) and, on 18 April 1962, the United States submitted a very detailed outline of all of the basic provisions of a single three-stage treaty (ENDC/30). Although one side calls its document a treaty and the other calls it an outline, both have submitted plans which are more concrete and detailed than any proposals submitted in the past, and have the same general structure.

There has also been some narrowing of the differences on the time in which general and complete disarmament is to be achieved. In its proposals of 18 September 1959 (A/4219) to the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union -- that is, Mr. Khrushchev, who presented those proposals -- called for the completion

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

of disarmament within a period of four years. Although that same proposal appeared in its plan of March 1962 (ENDC/2), the Soviet Union later submitted an amendment (ENDC/2/Rev.1) providing for the achievement of general and complete disarmament in five years rather than four, and completion of stage I in twenty-four months rather than twenty-one months after signature of the treaty. The United States made no specific mention of time limits in its programme of June 1960 (TNCD/7). However, in its plan of April 1962 time limits of three years were proposed for stages I and II and an agreed limit was to be determined for the third stage. While differences thus remain on the overall time in which a disarmament agreement is to be implemented, it is clear that in respect of the form of an agreement, staging and time-limits differences have been very significantly narrowed.

I come now to the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons themselves. Because it is one of the key problems under discussion more specifically today, and because it has been referred to by the two speakers who preceded me, I believe it is particularly important to view the recent proposals of each side in that field in the perspective of earlier positions. While differences at the moment may seem profound, once again it is clear that the two sides are closer together than they have been at any time in the past.

I shall first discuss the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In its plan submitted to the General Assembly in 1959 the Soviet Union called for the destruction all missiles in stage III. In its plan of June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev.1), and again in the draft treaty it submitted to this Conference, the proposals were radically different: all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles were to be destroyed in stage I. The United States plan of June 1960 contained no stage I measures for reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In stage II there were to be reductions of "agreed categories" of missiles, aircraft, and other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

At the outset of the present Conference the United States delegation made an important move towards agreement in that field by proposing a 30 per cent reduction of all armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, in stage I, and 35 per cent reductions in stages II and III. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of my country commented in his opening address to this Conference (ENDC/PV.4) that, in view

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

of the agreed principle of balance, it should be possible to negotiate the differences between the two sides.

Since that time there has of course been an important new development, which has been referred to extensively in previous speeches. In response to criticisms of its earlier proposals, the Soviet Union brought forward amendments which would allow the United States and the Soviet Union to retain an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles of certain categories until the end of the second stage. Although the Soviet Union has not yet, to our mind, explained the full purport and meaning of those proposals, it is obvious that the positions of the two sides have been brought closer by the Soviet Union's decision not to demand the total abolition of all nuclear weapon carriers in stage I, as it did previously. The Canadian delegation expects to discuss that problem further in a later statement.

In connexion with nuclear weapons and the production of fissile material, both sides have once again demonstrated some degree of flexibility. In its plan of September 1959 the Soviet Union proposed that the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be discontinued and that those existing should be destroyed in stage III. In its plan of June 1960 the destruction of all nuclear weapons was to take place in the second stage; and that proposal was also contained in the Soviet Union's plan of April 1962, although it has recently offered to transfer the applicable provisions to stage I should the West agree to that. The United States, in its plan of June 1960, proposed that nuclear weapons should be reduced to "agreed levels" in stage II. However, the United States now proposes that in stage II fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons should be reduced to "minimal levels". Production of fissile material for weapons purposes is to cease in the first stage, and there is now also a proposal to transfer a significant proportion of existing stocks to non-weapon uses in stage I.

Those provisions have the effect of bringing the United States proposals much closer to the Soviet view that all stockpiles should be eliminated in the second stage. Once again it seems to the Canadian delegation that the differences between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in this field have been significantly narrowed, and that the remaining questions could be eliminated by negotiation in this Conference.

I now turn to conventional armaments and armed forces. In that area of disarmament a striking similarity of position on the part of the two sides has developed. In 1960

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the United States and Soviet positions were far apart. Today the differences between them in this field are small. In the Soviet plan of June 1960 there were no specific proposals for reduction in strictly conventional weapons in the first stage. In stage II reductions were to take place proportionate to reductions in armed forces. The United States proposed in its plan of June 1960 that there should be a reduction in stage I of agreed types and quantities of armaments in relation to established force levels. It was provided that in stage II quantities of all kinds of armaments should be reduced to "agreed levels".

The position has entirely changed in the course of the proceedings in this Committee. The United States and the Soviet Union have evolved a common approach to the method of reducing conventional armaments. In its present plan the United States proposes a 30 per cent reduction of a wide variety of agreed types of armaments in stage I, and 35 per cent reductions in stages II and III. The Soviet Union proposed in this Conference that actual reductions should take place in stage I -- and not merely in stage II as in the 1960 plan -- and that those reductions should be proportionate to reductions in the levels of armed forces. But in the course of our proceedings the Soviet Union made a further important move by accepting the United States proposal of a 30 per cent reduction of conventional weapons in stage I and 35 per cent reductions in stages II and III.

The United States delegation for its part, in consideration of observations made here about its proposals, submitted amendments (ENDC/30, Add.1,2) last August on the question of the production and testing of weapons, which helped to close the remaining differences in this field. Those differences now relate mainly to whether a percentage reduction in stage I should cover all armaments or only a wide range of major types to be agreed. That in turn involves the problem of verifying destruction of smaller weapons. It seems to the Canadian delegation that the co-Chairmen could without delay work out the terms of agreement on conventional disarmament.

With regard to armed forces, a common position has also evolved. The Soviet Union's plan of June 1960 contained no measures for reduction of armed forces in stage I, although it provided for the total elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and foreign bases. In stage II of its 1960 plan the Soviet Union proposed a force level of 1.7 million for the United States and the Soviet Union and agreed levels for other countries.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The United States, on the other hand, proposed in June 1960 that, after the accession to the treaty of other militarily-significant States and after initial force levels had been verified, a force level of 2.1 million should be established in stage I for the United States and the Soviet Union.

What is the situation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee today? Once again it is clear that the positions of the two sides are much closer. The Soviet Union brought forward its former stage II proposals to stage I so as to take effect simultaneously with its proposals on nuclear disarmament and the elimination of foreign bases. A force level of 1.7 million was initially proposed by the Soviet Union, and this has recently been revised to a level of 1.9 million to come closer to the United States proposal of a level of 2.1 million for the two countries at the end of stage I.

The proposed force levels for the two sides are thus close at the end of stage I. They are even closer at the end of stage II, the Soviet Union plan calling for a force level of 1 million men, and that of the United States for 1.05 million.

My delegation, therefore, believes that the co-Chairmen should quickly iron out the slight remaining differences and submit to the Conference in the near future the terms of agreed draft provisions on this subject. We can see no reason why that should not be possible.

During earlier discussions in the Conference there was no common approach to peacekeeping. The explanations offered by the two sides during the opening round of discussions last spring seemed to many to confirm that there were fundamental differences between them. Nevertheless the Canadian delegation believes that those differences are not as great as may be thought, and I hope in future to compare in detail the various proposals in the two plans with a view to showing certain basic similarities of approach.

Perhaps the most important fact to underline is that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) sets forth the need for a United Nations peace force which will enable the United Nations effectively to deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. There has also been a coming together in the two plans. In the June 1960 proposals submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee by the Soviet Union there were no provisions on the subject of peacekeeping in stage I. It was only in the third stage, after the completion of joint studies in stage II, that measures were to be adopted for preserving peace and security

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

in accordance with the United Nations Charter and for placing at the disposal of the Security Council units from national contingents (TNDC/16/Rev.1,p.12).

However, in the present Soviet plan measures are proposed in the first stage for the conclusion of agreements, prior to the entry into force of the disarmament treaty, for making available to the Security Council, pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter, armed forces, assistance and facilities. In addition, the Soviet Union submitted for the first time proposals for undertaking general obligations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security -- for example, article 3(1) (c) requiring the States parties to the treaty "to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means". (ENDC/2/Rev.1,p.4). Those provisions represent a step towards developing a common approach with the United States on the subject of peace-keeping. Thus, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, there has been movement in that field as well as in others, and there are prospects for a further drawing together of the two plans.

Although I am turning to the subject of collateral measures last, I regard it as of very great importance for the work of this Conference. As I said in a recent statement (ENDC/PV.110, p.46), the Canadian delegation particularly regrets the inactivity of the collateral-measures Committee and the consequent failure to make any progress on measures to reduce international tension which could be put into effect before an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Canadian delegation believes that agreement could be achieved in the near future in several fields. For example, Canada suggested earlier in the Conference (ENDC/17) that steps be taken in the collateral measures Committee to prohibit orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. That is an area in which there are no substantial differences in the two plans, and in fact similar provisions were contained in both the United States and Soviet Union plans of June 1960. My delegation continues to believe that agreement in that field could do much towards halting the spread of the arms race. In that connexion perhaps other delegations have noted dispatches from Rome which indicate the possibility of extended co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, and we feel it would be an excellent thing if the two great Powers which are leading in that field would also agree to keep outer space peaceful.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Again, we see no reason why agreement could not be reached and put into effect at once. It would be welcomed by the entire world as evidence of the intention of the major Powers to end competition -- in one sphere at least -- in developing new and more deadly types of weapons and means of delivery for them. It would also give hope to the world that this Conference can achieve the vital tasks before it.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States plans submitted to the present Conference contain similar provisions regarding non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. That itself is a forward move, because the 1960 plan of the United States did not deal specifically with that. Once again the Canadian delegation believes that in the collateral-measures Committee it should be possible to reach an early agreement on that subject which could be put into effect without delay.

Agreement also seems possible on measures to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. The United States plan of 1962 contains a series of proposals on this subject which were elaborated in the paper (ENDC/70) submitted by the United States delegation in December 1962. These are more comprehensive than earlier United States proposals in this field. The Soviet Union responded favourably to the United States proposals by introducing entirely new modifications of its draft treaty which paralleled a number of provisions in the United States outline, such as those for the advance notification of large-scale national manoeuvres, exchange of military missions and establishment of swift and reliable communications between heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.14). The Canadian delegation believes that it should be possible to build on the measure of agreement which already exists on measures to prevent war by accident so as to reach an agreement on this subject which could come into effect very soon as a collateral measure.

I have outlined at some length the evidence that during the past two years both the United States and the Soviet Union have shown themselves willing to modify their plans in a number of fields and to put forward measures which would lead to a common position on various aspects of disarmament. I have tried to show that there has been movement in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and in particular that it is wrong to assert that willingness to modify positions in order to reach common ground has been all on one side.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Committee may feel that I have been too optimistic in this survey; that I have been wearing spectacles too rosy in colour. I admit that I have selected what is most favourable in the record of the past three years. But I do not ignore the apparent deadlock in the Conference on a number of the most important issues in the plans for general and complete disarmament and other matters before us. I would only point out that in the past we have appeared to be deadlocked on a number of questions on which the parties have later changed their positions, bringing them closer together. Unfortunately it seems to be true that the closer the great Powers come to agreement the more resistance there is to closing the last little gap.

What is my final conclusion? It is not that success in our task will come by our just sitting here and talking, but that it can be reached by a real effort of will — by all of us, and especially by the representatives of the great Powers, and of course those who stand behind them in the highest councils of their respective countries. It is our duty here to keep on working and thinking and, perhaps above all, hoping. What we must do is persist in our efforts, try and keep on trying to overcome the remaining differences. As our Secretary of State for External Affairs said in this Committee on 24 July last (ENDC/PV.60, p.32), the worst judgement of us that history could make would be that we failed because we did not try hard enough.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): We have now embarked on a new stage in the discussion of general and complete disarmament. It seems to me that at this juncture it would be useful to make some observations on the conditions under which this discussion has been resumed.

I think it can be said without risk of exaggeration that the general conviction of the need to eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction has never been so strong as at present. The recollection of what happened six months ago in the Caribbean is deeply rooted in the consciousness of men in all countries. We are aware that the differences which divide the two parties could be transformed into a trial of nuclear strength. The heavy responsibility for the fate of peace and of all mankind which rests on the shoulders of the two nuclear Powers has been brought home to us with renewed force. We have been able to observe the forces of imperialism in action,



(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

ready to launch out into an atomic adventure which was only avoided through the determination and political wisdom of the Soviet Union supported by men of peace in all continents.

If the Caribbean crisis has taught us anything, it is that the policy of peaceful co-existence and the peaceful solution of international disputes is the only basis for international relations under modern conditions. But the events of recent months have also made us realize that the nuclear armaments race has introduced into international affairs an extremely grave element of risk. We have been able to observe, contrary to the views of the advocates of the deterrence theory who are so numerous in the West, that a balance based on deterrence is extremely precarious, and that the desire to maintain or consolidate this balance may conceal adventurous tendencies. Have we not seen in the United States men who, for the sake of this balance, were ready to blow our planet to pieces?

At the same time we have been brought to realize the illusory nature of all attempts to escape from the dilemma of "war or peace", and to see how sterile are the efforts of certain Western strategists and politicians to seek refuge in new theories of strategy which assume, as a prerequisite for stable international relations, a choice between different forms of warfare rather than peace.

If this theoretical scaffolding had been constructed as an intellectual exercise, we might perhaps just manage to disregard it. Unfortunately, however, this is not so, for the theory is followed by the practical application of its premises, with varying consequences it is true. This does not prevent us from being constantly faced with new facts and new situations, entailing new dangers.

This process must therefore be halted. One cannot at the same time preach disarmament and step up the armaments race. We cannot but condemn a policy which consists in putting offensive nuclear weapons into the hands of the advocates of revenge, and our historic sense does not allow us to accept the argument that there is no relation between policy and armaments.

It must at last be realized that war is no longer a rational way of solving international disputes, and all the logical conclusions must be drawn from this realization. The elimination of war from the life of nations and the consolidation

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of peace presuppose disarmament. But the process of disarmament must be started by solving the most important problem: the removal of the danger of nuclear war by the elimination of nuclear weapons and their vehicles. This seems to be a clear postulate which should command general support. Unfortunately, as has been shown by the exchange of views which has taken place up to now, this approach is not shared by all the delegations to this Committee.

We are in fact faced with two points of view. The first, which is that of the socialist countries, has found expression in the proposal for the total destruction during the first stage of disarmament of all vehicles capable of delivering nuclear missiles to a target. The second — advocated by the Western Powers — presupposes a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles during the first stage, followed by a percentage reduction during the second and third stages of disarmament until their total liquidation.

We are therefore confronted with two conflicting concepts. The first aims at effecting a qualitative change in the armaments of the major Powers at the very beginning of the process of disarmament. The second has the effect of retaining up to the end of disarmament the danger of a nuclear conflagration. Members of the Committee are well aware that this divergence of approach to the problem of the liquidation of nuclear weapon vehicles has created the existing deadlock in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

In order to resume these negotiations and create conditions in which a formula could be found for the liquidation of nuclear weapon vehicles that would be acceptable to both parties, the Soviet Union on 22 September last submitted fresh proposals to the General Assembly (ENDC/2/Rev.1). According to these proposals the Soviet Union and the United States would retain until the end of the second stage, and exclusively on their own territory, an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and "ground-to-air" anti-aircraft missiles.

The presentation of these new proposals bears witness to the constructive spirit which the Soviet Union has brought to the negotiations on disarmament. These proposals are in fact an attempt to take into consideration, as far as possible and

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

without jeopardizing the main task assigned to us, the point of view of the Western Powers and in particular the argument that the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage might upset the balance existing between the two military groups in favour of the socialist countries.

In the course of the discussions which took place in this Committee last year, we had occasion to demonstrate that this argument had no basis in fact. I believe that this is borne out even more by the new Soviet proposals.

Let us therefore examine the problem of the security of individual States and the problem of collective security, as these would be affected by the application of the new method of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles as proposed by the Soviet Union.

In order to avoid a sterile discussion on the subject of the balance of power, we shall, in our examination of the different disarmament proposals, assume that from the military point of view a strategic balance exists between the East and the West, between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries. There can be no doubt that at present the most important element in this balance is constituted by strategic nuclear weapons with special emphasis on intercontinental missiles.

These strategic nuclear weapons are mainly, if not exclusively, located in the territory of two States, the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus the main elements of this strategic balance can be easily defined and modified quantitatively on the basis of a mutual reduction in the number of intercontinental missiles down to a certain agreed and strictly defined level as proposed by the Soviet Union, without upsetting the existing balance of power. The theoretical basis of this proposal is not new. I might add that the theory that a limited number of nuclear weapons can perfectly well act as an effective deterrent is advocated by many European and United States specialists, including Professor Jerome Wiesner.

Hence the application of the new Soviet proposal should satisfy the advocates of the mutual deterrence theory. Let us add that the Soviet proposals also provide for the retention by the two nuclear Powers of a certain number of anti-missile missiles and "ground-to-air" anti-aircraft missiles up to the end of the second stage. This should provide adequate protection against the threat of surprise attack.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Lastly, the new Soviet proposals should not be considered apart from other measures envisaged in the first two stages of general and complete disarmament according to the plan submitted by the Soviet Union. This new approach to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles falls logically into the framework of other provisions which cover the reduction of conventional armies and nuclear weapons and which, as we know, in their turn are prompted by the desire to maintain the balance of power and to strengthen the security of all countries.

Moreover, the legal possession of this strictly-limited number of nuclear weapon vehicles by the Soviet Union and the United States is strictly limited in time. Three years after the date on which a general and complete disarmament treaty comes into force, these vehicles too will be destroyed. Hence by their very existence they would provide a special kind of insurance that the terms of the treaty were being observed until such time as the process had gone so far as to be irreversible.

In analyzing the Soviet proposals of 22 September 1962 regarding the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, we must give due emphasis to their importance for the immediate consolidation of collective security. In the present international situation, collective security requires the creation from the very start of the disarmament process of a situation which would reduce to a minimum, and if possible completely eliminate, the risk of a nuclear conflict. These requirements would be fulfilled if the Soviet proposal were adopted.

In the first place it would very definitely reduce the risk of a nuclear war by stipulating that only two States could possess nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war by accident would therefore be substantially reduced.

Secondly, the risk of nuclear war would be reduced along the line of contact between the two military or political groupings. This would reduce tension in the most sensitive region of the world.

Thirdly, mutual confidence would be strengthened by removing and destroying nuclear weapon vehicles stationed on foreign territory.

Fourthly, the danger of disseminating nuclear weapons would be eliminated.

We have the choice of three methods of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles. The first is the immediate elimination of these vehicles on a one hundred per cent basis, which was the method proposed by the Soviet Union in its plan for

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

general and complete disarmament. We still consider that this is the best way of putting an end to nuclear warfare. Unfortunately, this proposal has been rejected by the Western Powers.

The second method is the reduction of the number of nuclear weapon vehicles on a percentage basis. We are of the opinion that this method contains inherent defects, whatever scale is employed. The Western version of this method has the added disadvantage of extending the elimination of these vehicles over the whole disarmament period. We have already shown on many occasions that with the nuclear arsenals and the number of missiles at present in the possession of the great Powers, such a method is in fact tantamount to retaining a feeling of insecurity and the threat of nuclear annihilation right up to the end of the disarmament process, which, on the basis of the Western plans, could be prolonged for an indefinite period.

The third method consists in leaving a certain strictly-limited number of nuclear weapon vehicles in the hands of certain countries for a definite period. This is the approach adopted in the Soviet Union's last proposal.

The choices are therefore limited. The first, and in our view the best, alternative has been to our great regret rejected by the Western Powers. The second is unlikely to lead us towards our objective. There only remains the third, that advocated in the last Soviet proposal. There is no fourth solution. That is the plain truth.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): This morning our United Kingdom colleague has already deplored the statement made at our last meeting by the Soviet representative which imputed the origin of the Caribbean crisis of last autumn to "aggressive actions of the United States and its military allies." (ENDC/PV.111, p.27) Sir Paul Mason has convincingly refuted that statement, and I shall not dwell upon it, because I too believe that such statements do not advance our work in this Conference.

But I must comment also on one remark just made by the representative of Poland, who ascribed all credit for averting the possible disastrous consequences of that crisis to "the determination and political wisdom of the Soviet Union supported by men of peace in all continents." (supra, p.25) Since, in the terminology of the Eastern bloc, the United States and its military allies are not always included in the term "peace-loving nations of the world", I must take issue with the Polish representative's statement, and in any case it does not have balance.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We do not need to argue the merits of the Caribbean crisis in this Committee. I think we can all accept that there was a very dangerous crisis, and that it was through the leaders of both great nations involved that the disastrous consequences of that crisis were averted. I hope we do not need to discuss the matter further in our Committee, because, I repeat, I do not believe it advances our efforts. My delegation will study in the verbatim records the statements made by the representative of Poland and by the representative of Romania and will reply to them as may be warranted.

This morning I should like to comment very briefly on the statement we heard from our Canadian colleague, Mr. Burns. Before commenting, I would say that I understood from Mr. Burns that the paper<sup>1/</sup> which he had circulated was for the purpose of assisting us to follow his very helpful statement. If he is thinking of using it for a more formal purpose -- as a Conference document, for instance -- we hope that he will give us an opportunity of making some comments in detail upon it, because in some points it does not reflect completely the various changes in the United States position. For example, on page 2, under the heading "Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material", there is no mention of our present position with regard to nuclear weapons and fissile material in stage III of the outline of our plan (ENDC/30 and Add.1,2). Nevertheless, I think the paper was extremely useful in helping us to follow the statement made by the Canadian representative.

I thought that that statement served to put into perspective the work that we have done and are doing in connexion with general and complete disarmament. Many of us at times are discouraged about where we now stand and at what seems to us to be the slowness of movement towards final agreement; but I think that the Canadian representative's statement showed us clearly that where we now stand, unsatisfactory as this may be, is not where we once stood, and that there have been movements -- and, we freely admit, movements on both sides -- towards each other. I think it was very useful in this resumption of our discussion and negotiation on general and complete disarmament to have that put into perspective by our Canadian colleague, and I thank him.

Now I should like to follow up some of the statements made by our United Kingdom colleague. Sir Paul pointed out that the West had raised certain questions in connexion with the Soviet proposal (A/PV.1127, p.38-40) for the retention until the end of stage II of an agreed number of specified types of nuclear delivery vehicles. He cited

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<sup>1/</sup> ENDC/79

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

a statement made at our last meeting by the Soviet representative (ENDC/PV.111, p.33) claiming that the Soviet delegation had, in November and December 1962, given the necessary clarifications and explanations on the Soviet proposal and had replied to a number of questions which had been put to it. The Soviet representative went on to say that the main thing now was for the United States and the West to agree to the Soviet proposal.

I should like to emphasize just one illustration -- to which the United Kingdom representative has already referred -- of the fact that, neither in our meetings before the recess nor in the most recent statement of the Soviet representative at our last meeting, have we obtained the information from the Soviet representative which would enable us fully to appraise the Soviet proposal.

In my own statement at our last meeting I asked the Soviet delegation to clarify for us what the Soviet attitude was towards the verification aspects of the Soviet proposal providing for the retention of an agreed, strictly-limited number of certain nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II. We raised that point because in the past the Soviet delegation had claimed that its proposal for a total elimination of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in stage I would be easy to verify, since unauthorized retention of even a single such vehicle would clearly constitute a violation of the treaty. The Soviet delegation had been making that claim in an effort to defend its position on verification which, as we understood it and as we unfortunately still understand it, excludes verification of agreed levels of armaments retained by parties to the treaty.

I submit that it must be clear, even to the Soviet delegation, that its proposal for the retention of an agreed, strictly-limited number of nuclear-delivery vehicles until the end of stage II by its very nature raises the problem of how the parties would be assured that the numbers of the delivery vehicles retained were indeed those which had been agreed. Yet at our last meeting all the Soviet representative was able to say to us on that point was that

"the Soviet proposal for the retention of an agreed number of missiles enables us to facilitate considerably the solution of the problem of control over general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.111, p.34)

We hope very much that that is true; but we submit that that statement sheds no light whatsoever upon how the Soviet Union envisages verification of the agreed levels of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles to be retained. It seems to us

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

that that is a matter which should be of concern to all of us, including, specifically, the Soviet Union; because surely the Soviet Union itself would wish to have the assurance that the number of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles retained, for example by the United States, was indeed the number which had been agreed. The degree of such assurance required would obviously be in inverse proportion to the level of armaments retained, because the lower the number of retained vehicles the greater would be the importance of each of them. Without such assurance there would be no safeguards protecting the national security of States, and the result of such a situation could, we submit, be disastrous.

The very terms of the Soviet proposal indicate that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the levels of retained nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles being those specified in the agreement. The Soviet proposal speaks of the retention of "agreed strictly-limited" levels. It seems to us, therefore, to be incumbent upon the Soviet delegation to indicate how the Soviet Union proposes to provide assurance to the parties that the agreement is really being fulfilled. After all, the Soviet Union is, as we understand it, not suggesting that some indefinite number of vehicles be retained; the question seems to be that of a specific number, a specific figure. Obviously, States would not feel secure unless it could be ascertained on a continuing basis that the reduced levels agreed upon had been indeed reached and were not exceeded.

I submit that general statements by the Soviet delegation do not help us -- statements such as that made by Mr. Tsarapkin at our last meeting when he asserted that:

"The retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of inter-continental missiles, which would deter any aggressor who might contemplate violating the treaty, as well as the retention of anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles capable of protecting the security of States in the event of such a violation would make any concealment of armaments pointless." (ibid., p.34)

What we need is a straightforward statement by the Soviet Union on what verification arrangements it believes would be adequate to ensure that its proposal, if implemented, would be faithfully observed.

We continue to hope that, despite the disappointment we have so far experienced as a result of the continuing unwillingness of the Soviet delegation to enlighten us on the full meaning of the Soviet proposal, the Soviet representative will in due course --



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

we hope soon -- be in a position to provide us with the clarification and elaboration requested. We trust that the Soviet delegation understands that the longer it continues to speak about its proposal in generalities, which more often than not tend only to add to the nebulous character of the proposal, the longer our Committee will be delayed in examining seriously what we had hoped might be an effort on the part of the Soviet Union to bridge the gap existing between us on the problem of reducing armaments.

Mr. LALL (India): I wish to make just a few remarks on the statements made this morning. We thought that our colleague from Canada had made a great and a very helpful effort to show us how our work has been progressing despite the lack of agreement on any major issue before us. We also listened with great attention to the very thoughtful statements made by our other colleagues, Sir Paul Mason and our colleagues from Romania and Poland, and in a moment I shall be coming to the statement made by the representative of the United States.

As our Canadian colleague pointed out, there has been a marked approach towards common ground on the issue of conventional armaments and armed forces. There has been a less marked approach -- a probing, shall I say? -- towards agreement on the matter of the delivery of nuclear weapons. But we are making these remarks primarily because it seemed to us that -- accidentally, if I may say so, because I do not think it was premeditated between the representatives of the United States and Poland -- after the argument of our Polish colleague that the Soviet Union had made a great effort by proposing a compromise from its original position of the 100 per cent destruction of all vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I, the United States representative, by the nature of his statement, was showing a very considerable interest in that particular proposal by the Soviet Union. He was in fact asking for some clarification of important issues connected with that proposal.

We in our delegation take that to indicate a genuine interest in the proposal. It seems to us that it would further very much the kind of movement which our colleague from Canada was trying to bring out if that precise point could be pursued -- the point which has been argued at great length by our Polish colleague as a movement towards compromise, and to which the United States delegation has responded by showing its real interest.

(Mr. Lall, India)

We would urge the delegations concerned to concentrate further on this issue and, in particular, to pursue the question of verification of this matter -- and, of course, of the figures involved, because the Soviet proposal refers to a specific and strictly-limited number of vehicles and defensive capacities against the abuse of an agreement drafted on the lines it proposes, if such an agreement is reached.

So we hope that the movement towards each other which is implicit in the statements made today, the signs of interest on the two sides which have been indicated, will not be lost by our going off and discussing some other -- if I may borrow a phrase used frequently here in another context -- morass of detail. I am asking the two sides to concentrate a little on this issue of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles, and to examine carefully the statements made today and at our last meeting which are germane to it, and to see whether they can move together. If they can, then, taking into account the movement made already in the sphere of conventional weapons and conventional forces, we might be in a position to give the General Assembly something positive in our next report. My delegation very much hopes that that concentration of effort will take place, and will take place with good effect.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico)(translation from Spanish): I have no further speakers on my list, and if no one else wishes to speak I shall read out a recommendation of the co-Chairmen:

(continued in English)

"The co-Chairmen have held a further discussion on the question of how the Committee can best consider the various collateral measures which have been or may be proposed. They recommend as a temporary arrangement that, in general, the plenary meeting on Friday of each week should be reserved for these problems. At these meetings each delegation would be free to address itself to any collateral measure that it wished. As under the prior decision of the Committee, Monday meetings would continue to be reserved for the test-ban problem, while Wednesday meetings would be devoted to consideration of questions of general and complete disarmament. The possibility would, of course, remain open that the Wednesday or Friday meeting in any week could also be set aside for the test-ban problem if the Committee so decided."

(The Chairman, Mexico)

(continued in Spanish)

That is the recommendation of the co-Chairmen. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the recommendation is adopted.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twelfth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Romania, Canada, Poland, the United States of America and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 25 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.



CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

EMDC/PV.112/Corr.1

11 June 1963

ENGLISH only

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 13 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

CORRIGENDUM TO THE  
FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

Page 10:

second line, insert a dash after the word "number"

(above the agreed number -- by retaining anti-missile  
missiles.)

